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Casenote
The Beginning of the End:
United States v. Alabama and the
Doctrine of Self-Deportation

I.

INTRODUCTION

"Remember, remember always that all of us, and you and I especially,
are descended from immigrants and revolutionists."
-Franklin D. Roosevelt 1
In United States v. Alabama,' a three-judge panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit struck down several
sections of Alabama's Hammon-Beason Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen
Protection Act (H.B. 56). 3 This Act-which has been called the strictest
anti-immigration law in the country-demonstrates a growing trend
among states to exert more control over immigration regulation.4
Writing for the court, Judge Wilson concluded that federal law preempted sections 10, 11(a), 13(a), 16, 17, and 27 of H.B. 56.' In so holding,
the Eleventh Circuit gave a victory to those championing the rights of
illegal immigrants while also curtailing the power of the states to
regulate within their own borders.

1. Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Public Papersand Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt,
1938, RESPECTFULLY QUOTED: A DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS (last visited Apr. 2, 2013),
http://www.bartleby.com/73/882.html.
2. 691 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012).

3. 2011 Ala. Acts 2011-525 (H.B. 56); Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1301.
4. Richard Fausset, Alabama Enacts Anti-illegal-immigration Law Described as
Nation'sStrictest, L.A. TImEs, June 10, 2011, http'//articles.latimes.com/printl2OljunlO/
nation/la-na-alabama-immigration-20110610.
5. Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1301.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A.

Enactment of H.B. 56
The Alabama legislature passed H.B. 56 on June 2, 2011 based on
finding that "immigration is causing economic hardship and lawlessness
in [Alabama] and that illegal immigration is encouraged when public
agencies within [Alabama] provide public benefits without verifying
immigration status." Governor Bentley signed H.B. 56 into law that
same month.' According to Representative Hammon, a sponsor of the
law, its purpose was to "attack[] every aspect of an illegal alien's life" in
order to force them to "deport themselves." s As stated in the legislative
findings, H.B. 56 was designed to "discourage illegal immigration within
the state and maximize enforcement of federal immigration laws through
cooperation with federal authorities." Shortly thereafter, organizations
such as the Immigration Reform Law Institute characterized the law as
the "most advanced state" immigration law to date. 10
Several sections of H.B. 56, some mirroring those of Arizona's S.B.
1070 recently addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Arizona
v. United States," were put forth to achieve Alabama's legislative
purpose. This Note will focus on sections 10, 11(a), and 12(a), which all
emulate Arizona's law, as well as section 27. First, section 10 makes the
"willful failure to complete or carry registration documents in violation
of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1304(e) [or] 1306(a)" a crime. 12 Under section 11, it was
a crime for an unlawfully present alien to solicit, apply for, or perform
work of any kind within the state of Alabama.13 Section 12 required
law enforcement officers to determine the immigration status of any
individual who had been stopped or was under arrest if the officer
14
reasonably suspected the person may be in the country illegally.

6. ALA. CODE § 31-13-2 (2011).

7. 2011 Ala. Acts 2011-525 (H.B. 56).
8. Human Rights Watch, No Way to Live (Dec. 14, 2011), available at http://www.
hrw.org/node/103511/section/2.
9. Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1276.
10. IMMIGRATION REFORM L. INST., Alabama Passes the Most Advanced State
Immigration Law in U.S. History (2011), available at http://www.irli.org/node/39.
11. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
12. Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1282.
13. ALA. CODE § 31-13-11(a) (2011).
14. AiA. CODE § 31-13-12 (2011) ("Upon any lawful stop, detention, or arrest made by

a... law enforcement officer of this state... where reasonable suspicion exists that the
person is an alien who is unlawfully present in the United States, a reasonable attempt
shall be made... to determine the citizenship and immigration status of the person ....
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Importantly, the determination of immigration status was to be based
upon federal standards.15 Also similar to S.B. 1070, section 12 contains
provisions which aim at lightening the burden that could be caused to
minority groups by the effects of the statute."6 Additionally, this Note
will look at the court's analysis of section 27, which represented a new
attempt at state control over immigration by prohibiting state courts
from enforcing any contract where an illegal immigrant was a party if
the contract required the unlawfully present individual to remain in the
country for more than twenty-four hours after its formation in order to
perform the contract, and the other party "had direct or constructive
knowledge" of their illegal status. 7

B. ProceduralHistory
The United States Department of Justice and the Obama administration brought suit against Alabama, claiming that federal law preempted
the Alabama law.' s Judge Sharon Blackburn of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama ruled on the validity
of the law on September 28, 2011.'9 In her opinion, Judge Blackburn
upheld sections 10, 12, 18, 27, 28, and 30.20 Two principles guided her
analysis: the congressional purpose of the underlying federal statute,
and whether Congress had legislated in a traditionally state-occupied

Any alien who is arrested and booked into custody shall have his or her immigration status
").
determined..
15. Id. § 31-13-12(a).
16. Id. § 31-13-12(c) ("A law enforcement officer may not consider race, color, or
national origin in implementing the requirements of this section....").
17. ALA. CODE § 31-13-26(a) (2011). Several exemptions exist from the scope of section
27. If the contract is for overnight lodging, purchase of food, medical services, or serves the
purpose of returning the alien to his country of origin, the contract will be capable of being
enforced. Id. § 31-13-26(b). Additionally, contracts that are authorized by the federal
government are outside the scope of section 27. Id. § 31-13-26(c). While outside the scope
of this paper, section 27 was not the only new attempted avenue of control over
immigration law put forth by H.B. 56. Section 16 bars employers from receiving state tax
deductions for wages and compensation paid to any alien unauthorized to work in the
United States. Id. § 31-13-16(a). In similar fashion, section 17 labels it a "discriminatory
practice" for an employer to fire or fail to hire an American citizen or an alien authorized
to work in favor of an alien who is not authorized to work in this country. Id. § 31-1317(a). Section 18 adds to a preexisting law by requiring an officer who stops an individual
driving without a valid license to make a reasonable effort within the next forty-eight hours
to ascertain the driver's citizenship. Id. § 32-6-9(c). Finally, section 29, as amended by
H.B. 56, disallows illegal aliens from entering, or attempting to enter, "a public records
transaction" with the state. Id. § 31-13-29(b), amended by H.B. 56 § 1.
18. United States v. Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1292 (N.D. Ala. 2011).
19. Id. at 1282.
20. Id. at 1351.
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field."l Subsequently, Judge Blackburn issued preliminary injunctions
against sections 11(a), 13, 16, and 17 based on the likelihood of
successful preemption challenges.22
Following the district court's ruling, the United States appealed the
denials of preliminary injunctions, and Alabama subsequently crossappealed the injunctions granted by the district court. The United
States sought an injunction pending appeal against the sections that
were denied by the district court in order to maintain the status quo
until the appeal could be heard. A panel of judges of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ultimately granted injunctions
pending appeal against sections 10, 27, 28, and 30, leaving sections 12
and 18 as the only ones currently intact and enforced.23
III.
A.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Federal Preemption

The foundation for the doctrine of preemption is provided by the
Supremacy Clause, which states:
[Tihe Laws of the United States[,] which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 24
Therefore, "ifa federal statute establishes a rule, and if the Constitution grants Congress the power to establish that rule, then the rule
preempts whatever state law it contradicts."2" Consequently, courts
necessarily begin by establishing that Congress validly enacted the
federal law in question within the limitations of its enumerated
powers.26 Courts are "guided by two cornerstones" when determining
the extent to which state law is preempted by federal law. First, "'the
purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption

21. Id. at 1300-01.
22. Id. at 1351.
23. Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1280.
24.

U.S. CONST. art. VI,

§

1, cl. 2.

25. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 264 (2000).
26. William Hochul III, Enforcement in Kind: Reexamining the PreemptionDoctrinein
Arizona v. United States, 87 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 2225, 2227 (2012).
27. Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1282 (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009))
(internal quotation marks omitted).

20131

UNITED STATES V. ALABAMA

1097

case.'" 2" Second, the preemption analysis is guided by an "'assumption
that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded
29
... unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'
This has been labeled the presumption against preemption and has led
to a level of deference to state and local laws within areas of traditional
state concern. 30 However, when a state regulates in an area with "a
history of significant federal 'presence," the presumption against
preemption is not applied.31
Congress can demonstrate its intent to preempt state law "by express
language in a congressional enactment [express preemption], by
implication from the depth and breadth of a congressional scheme that
occupies the legislative field [field preemption], or by implication because
of a conflict with a congressional enactment [conflict preemption].'
1. Express Preemption. Express preemption will be found when
a federal law includes a clause explicitly removing specified powers from
the states. Courts focus on the plain language of preemption clauses
when they are included, as it "necessarily contains the best evidence of
Congress' preemptive intent."33 For example, the Immigration Reform
and Control Act' has an express preemption clause that prohibits "any
State or local law [from] imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than
through licensing and similar laws)" on employers who hire undocumented immigrants.35
2. Field Preemption. Field preemption will be found where "'the
federal interest is so dominant"' in a federal regulatory scheme that it
may be presumed that Congress intended to occupy the entire area of
law, leaving no room for state action.3" The Court has found that some

28. Id. (quoting Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 565).
29. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 565 (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,485 (1996)).
30. Jennifer R. Phillips, Arizona'sS.B. 1070 and FederalPreemptionof State and Local
ImmigrationLaws: A Case for a More Cooperative and StreamlinedApproach to Judicial
Review of SubnationalImmigration Laws, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 955, 967 (2012) (discussing
that areas of traditional state concern include the "health, safety, and welfare of its
citizens.").
31. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000).
32. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001) (citations omitted).
33. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1977 (2011) (quoting CSX
Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
34. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8

U.S.C.).
35. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006).
36. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
190, 204 (1983) (quoting Fidelity Fed. Sav.& Loan Ass'n v. de la Cupsta, 458 U.S. 141, 153
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federal regulatory schemes are "so pervasive" that "Congress left no
room for the States to supplement it."37 Furthermore, the "federal
interest" in a field can be "so dominant" that federal law "will be
assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject."38
A finding of field preemption results in states being either limited or
excluded from the field. 9
3. Conflict Preemption. It is well settled that a state law which
"actually conflicts" with a federal statute is preempted, even if the
statute contains no express preemption clause or does not impliedly
occupy a field.4 ° State law is conflict-preempted when it "stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes ... of
Congress, ' as well as when it is a "physical impossibility" to comply
with both the federal and state law.42 Conflict preemption has been
found when local immigration law "has had a deleterious effect on the
United States' foreign relations."43 Ultimately, "'a statute is preempted
...
if it conflicts with federal law making compliance with both state
and federal law impossible."'"
B.

Arizona v. United States

The Supreme Court recently addressed self-deportation styled
immigration law in Arizona v. United States.45 In an opinion delivered
by Justice Kennedy, the Court considered whether four provisions of
Arizona's Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act
(S.B. 1070)46 were preempted by federal immigration laws.47 Justice

(1982)); see also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (holding that
congressional purpose to supersede historic state powers can be inferred from an area in
which there is a "dominant" federal interest in a federal regulatory scheme).
37. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
38. Id.
39. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000).
40. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
41. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowtiz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
42. Id. (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
43. United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 352 (9th Cir. 2011).
44. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 701 F. Supp. 2d 835, 853
(N.D. Tex. 2010) (quoting Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 577 F.
Supp. 2d 858, 867 (N.D. Tex. 2008)).
45. 132 S.Ct. 2492 (2012).
46. Az. S. Bill 1070, 2d Reg. Sess. (codified in scattered sections of ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN.).

47. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2497.
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Kennedy began by framing the court's preemption analysis based on the
framework laid out above.45
The Court first determined the validity of section 3 of S.B. 1070, which
prohibited the "willful failure to complete or carry an alien registration
document... in violation of 8 [U.S.C. §] 1304(e) or 1306(a)." 9 Justice
Kennedy concluded that, based upon the framework enacted by
Congress, the federal government had "occupied the field of alien
registration."" In response to Arizona's assertion that section 3 was
valid because it had the same goal as its federal counterpart, Justice
Kennedy further stated that "[W]here Congress occupies an entire field,
as it has in the field of alien registration, even complementary state
regulation is impermissible."5 Therefore, Justice Kennedy concluded
that section 3 was preempted by federal law because Congress intended
to occupy the entire field of alien registration.52
Next, Justice Kennedy turned to section 5(C), which created a state
misdemeanor for "an unauthorized alien to knowingly apply for work,
solicit work in a public place or perform work as an employee or
independent contractor."5 3 Such a punishment was not contemplated
by the law's federal counterpart, the Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986 (IRCA) 54 which imposes penalties on the employer rather
than on the employee.5 5 The Court looked to the legislative history of
the IRCA, holding that Congress deliberately did not impose penalties
upon unlawfully present aliens who seek employment.56
While
Arizona's law shares the same goal as the IRCA,5" "it involves a conflict
in the method of enforcement" by punishing those Congress intentionally
chose not to.5" Therefore, Justice Kennedy held that section 3 was
conflict preempted by the IRCA due to "interfer[ing] with the careful

48. Id. at 2500-01.
49. Id. at 2501 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-

1509(A) (2010) (West).
50. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2502.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 2503.
53. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2928(C)
(2010) (West Supp. 2011).
54. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8

U.S.C.).
55. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a(a)(1)(A), (a)(2) (2006).
56. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2504.
57. Both aim to deter unlawful employment of those unlawfully present within the
country. Id. at 2505.
58. Id.
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balance struck by Congress with respect to unauthorized employment of
aliens. 59
However, the Court did not hold that federal law preempted section
2(B), which required state police officers to make a "reasonable attempt
...to determine the immigration status" of any individual whom they
have arrested, detained, or stopped, provided a "reasonable suspicion
exists that the person is an alien and is unlawfully present in the United
States." 0 In enacting this provision, Arizona integrated three limitations.6 1 In light of the self-imposed limitations and the uncertainty
surrounding how the law would be enforced, Justice Kennedy held that
section 2(B) was not preempted at the time.62 In so holding, he
emphasized the importance to the immigration system of communication
between federal and state officials.63 Additionally, Justice Kennedy
expressly left open the possibility of future challenges, stating, "This
opinion does not foreclose other preemption and constitutional challenges
4
to the law as interpreted and applied after it goes into effect.6
Therefore, the Court held that section 3 and 5(C) were preempted by
federal law.65 Conversely, the Court held it to be improper at the time

59. Id.

60. Id. at 2507; see also ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2012). The law further
provided that anyone arrested would also have their immigration status determined prior
to being released. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2507.
61. Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2507-08; see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2012).
First, there is a presumption that a detainee is not an unlawfully present alien when he
or she presents a valid Arizona driver's license or similar identification. Arizona, 132 S.
Ct. at 2507. Second, officers "may not consider race, color or national origin... except to
the extent permitted by the United States [and] Arizona Constitution[s]." Id. at 2508
(alteration in original); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT ANN. § 11-1051(B). And third, the law
must be "implemented in a manner consistent with federal law regulating immigration,
protecting the civil rights of all persons and respecting the privileges and immunities of
United States citizens." Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2508; see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 111051(L).
62. Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2509-10.
63. Id. at 2508. "Congress has made clear that no formal agreement or special training
needs to be in place for state officers to 'communicate with the [Federal Government]
regarding the immigration status of any individual, including reporting knowledge that a
particular alien is not lawfully present in the United States.'" Id. (alteration in original);
see also 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10)(A).
64. Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2510.
65. Id. The Court additionally held section 6 preempted, which provided that a state
officer "without a warrant, may arrest a person if the officer has probable cause to believe
... [the person] has committed any public offense that makes [him] removable from the
United States." Id. at 2505 (alterations in original); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 133883(A)(5) (2010).
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to enjoin section 2(B) before the law could be enforced by state officials
and interpreted by state courts.66
IV. COURT'S RATIONALE

On August 20, 2012, a three-judge panel for the Eleventh Circuit
decided whether to enjoin several sections of Alabama's H.B. 56.67
Specifically, the issue before the court was whether H.B. 56 should be
enjoined as preempted by federal law in light of the Supreme Court's
ruling in Arizona v. United States,6" which was the first opinion to
provide the lower courts with any guidance in responding to the growing
number of states pushing the boundaries of state immigration policies.
The panel unanimously followed the Supreme Court's lead on the
provisions mirroring the ones at issue in Arizona, and also held several
additional provisions of Alabama's69 law-which went far beyond
Arizona's-preempted by federal law.

A.

Opinion
Judge Wilson began the opinion by noting that in order to grant a
preliminary injunction, the moving party must establish: "(1) substantial
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury will be suffered
unless the injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to the movant
outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the
opposing party; and (4) if issued, the injunction would not be adverse to
the public interest.""0 However, the court noted that the focus of the
issue was on whether the United States is likely to succeed on its
preemption claims.7 1
1. Section 10. Writing for the court, Judge Wilson analyzed each
section individually, beginning with section 10, which made an illegal
alien's "'willful failure to complete or carry an alien registration
documents' in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1304(e) [or] 1306(a)" a state
crime." Acknowledging that a very similar provision was held to be
preempted in Arizona, the court reversed the district court's decision and

66. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2510.
67. Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1280-81; Ala. H.B. 56, 2011 Ala. Acts 2011-525.
68. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
69. Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1280-81.
70. Id. at 1281 (quoting McDonald's Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir.
1998)).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1282 (quoting Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2501); see also H.B. 56 § 10.
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held that federal law preempted section 10." Relying on the Supreme
Court's determination that the federal government has occupied the
entire field of alien registration, the court concluded that "even
complementary state regulation is impermissible."7 4 Even if the goal
of the state is shared by the federal government, the law would still be
preempted in order to prevent any dilution of federal control over the
desired field. v5
2. Section 11(a). Likewise, the court relied on Arizona to hold
section 11(a), which cannot be distinguished from section 5(C) of
Arizona's S.B. 1070 by making it a crime for an unlawfully present
individual to apply for work, expressly preempted by federal law." In
that case, the Supreme Court determined that the federal government
enacted the IRCA with the intention of establishing a "comprehensive
framework" to deal with individuals who employ illegal aliens.7
Furthermore, the fact that Congress chose not to impose consequences
on illegal aliens who accept employment, but only those employers who
chose to hire said unauthorized aliens, was determinative in the Court's
7
analysisY.
Therefore, Judge Wilson held section 11(a) was expressly
preempted by federal law based on the decision by Congress that "'it
would be inappropriate to impose criminal79penalties on aliens who seek
or engage in unauthorized employment.'

3. Section 12(a). Judge Wilson, in examining section 12(a), which
created an obligation on law enforcement officers to check the immigration status of any stopped individual whom the officer has a reasonable
suspicion is in the country illegally, relied on another immigration case
that he authored earlier the same day- Georgia Latino Alliance for
Human Rights (GLAHR) v. Deal,8° - where the Eleventh Circuit

73. Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1282.
74. Id. (quoting Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2502) (internal quotation marks omitted).
75. Id.

76. Id. at 1283.
77. Id. (quoting Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2504) (internal quotation marks omitted).
78. Id.
79. Id. (quoting Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2505).
80. 691 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2012). In GLAHR, several organizations challenged the
validity of section 7 and 8 of Georgia's Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act
of 2011 (H.B. 87). Id. at 1256-57. Section 7 created crimes for three different interactions
with an "illegal alien." Id. at 1256. First, it made the "transporting or moving of an illegal
alien" a crime, if the individual transporting the alien is doing so intentionally and with
the knowledge that the person is in the country illegally. Id.; see also O.C.G.A. § 16-11200(b) (2011). Secondly, in similar fashion, section 7 also created a crime for "concealing
or harboring an illegal alien." GLAHR, 691 F.3d at 1256; see also O.C.GA. § 16-11-201(b).
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further applied Arizona.s" Based on the Supreme Court's rejection of
a pre-enforcement challenge to the identical Arizona law, the court2
likewise concluded that section 12(a) is not preempted by federal law.
In so holding, Judge Wilson relied on the notion clarified by the Supreme
Court that "'[c]onsultation between federal and state officials is an
important feature of the immigration system,"' giving state officers
permission to communicate with federal officials regarding the immigration status of any individual.'
However, just as in Arizona, Judge
Wilson expressly left open the possibility of future challenges if the scope
of the law conflicts with federal law once put into practice.'
4. Section 27. Judge Wilson then considered section 27, which
prohibited the recognition of contracts between an unlawfully present
alien and a party who was aware-constructively or explicitly-that the
alien's presence was unlawful. 5 Contracts were permitted in the
foregoing situation only when the contract could reasonably be completed
within twenty-four hours, as well as contracts for overnight lodging,
food, medical services, and transportation "that is intended to facilitate

Finally, section 7 made it a crime to "induce[] an illegal alien to enter into [Georgia]."
GLAHR, 691 F.3d at 1256 (second alteration in original); see also O.C.G.A. § 16-11-202(b).
The court found section 7 to be preempted by federal law, both due to the comprehensive
nature of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and because it directly conflicted with
federal law by creating new crimes unparalleled by the federal government. GLAHR, 691
F.3d at 1263-67. Section 8 gave Georgia law enforcement officers the right to determine
the immigration status of an individual which the officer has probable cause to believe had
committed another crime, and the individual could not produce a piece of identification
listed in the statute. Id.; see also O.C.G.A. § 15-5-100(b) (2011). This section contained
similar prohibitions as Alabama's law, prohibiting consideration of "race, color, or national
origin." GLAHR, 691 F.3d at 1267; see also O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100(b). The court, relying on
Arizona, held section 8 not to be preempted. GLAHR, 691 F.3d at 1268. Compared to
Arizona's law, the court believed Georgia's to be facially less problematic, in that it only
authorized but did not require officers to look into an individual's background. Id. Also,
it contained the same inherent limitations as the Arizona law. Id. The court, just as the
Supreme Court did in Arizona, left open the possibility of future challenges based on the
law's application. Id. at 1268 n.12.
81. Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1283-84.
82. Id. at 1284.
83. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2508). The Court in
Arizona furthermore looked to the fact that Congress has provided a system by which state
officers can contact federal officials, and has ordered that Immigration and Customs
Enforcement respond to state inquiries relating to the immigration status of an individual.
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2508.
84. Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1285.
85. Id. at 1292-93; see also ALA. CODE § 31-13-26(a) (2011).
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the alien's return to his or her country of origin."8 Judge Wilson,
stating that to call section 27 "extraordinary and unprecedented would
be an understatement," believed that the sole purpose of the law was to
make the lives of those unlawfully within the state of Alabama so
miserable that they no longer have "the ability to maintain even a
minimal existence." 7
Ultimately, the court looked to the exclusive power granted to the
federal government to expel aliens.'
Quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 9
Judge Wilson determined this power "'is entrusted with full and
exclusive responsibility for the conduct of affairs with foreign sovereignties,' which includes the field of immigration." 0 Therefore, in light of
the fact that any state which imposes "distinct, unusual[,] and extraordinary burdens and obligations upon aliens" could be trespassing into a
field of federal regulation, the court found that this "blanket prohibition"
most certainly qualified as an extraordinary burden.91 Ultimately,
Judge Wilson held section 27 as field-preempted "by the inherent power
of the federal government to regulate immigration." 2
B.

Equitable Factors

The court held that the equities favor enjoining the provisions found
to be preempted by federal law, further stating that the United States
suffers harm when invalid state regulations destabilize valid federal
law.93 Additionally, the court noted no harm to the public for the nonenforcement of invalid state regulation.94 Therefore, it held that the

86. Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1293 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also ALA. CODE
§ 31-13-26(b).

87. Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1293. The court further stated that the ability to contract
is not merely something granted by the legislature out of goodwill; it is something that "in

practical application, is essential for an individual to live and conduct daily affairs." Id.
88. Id. at 1293-94. See Fok Young Yo v. United States, 185 U.S. 296, 302 (1902); Fong
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 706-07 (1893).
89. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
90. Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1293 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 62-63).
91. Id. (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 65) (internal quotation marks omitted).
92. Id. at 1294. Alabama argued that section 27 was protected because the field of
contract law is "typically within the province of the states and therefore entitled to the
presumption against preemption." Id. at 1295. Following the Supreme Court's instruction
that preemption analysis must also consider the practical effect of the state law, not just
the means by which the state attempts to achieve their purpose, the court rejected this
argument. Id. at 1296. While contracts are an area of typical state concern, Alabama
could not enforce section 27 without intruding into an area of federal law. Id.
93. Id. at 1301.
94. Id.
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equities were in favor of enjoining enforcement of sections 10, 11(a),
13(a), 16, 17, and 27.
C.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the court held that the United States was likely to
succeed on the merits on their challenges to sections 10, 11(a), 13(a), 16,
17, and 27.96 While acknowledging that Alabama, just like Arizona, is
"'understandabl[y] frustat[ed] with the problems caused by illegal immigration,"' he stressed ' that
states must "'not pursue policies that
97
undermine federal law. '
V. IMPLICATIONS
The Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Alabama represents the first
determination on self-deportation anti-immigration law by an appeals
court since the Supreme Court's ruling on Arizona's immigration law.
While the court did not invalidate all of Alabama's law, enough pieces
were struck down to defeat the self-deportation ideology behind it.9"
Therefore, the decision overall represents a setback for states seeking to
circumvent federal authority in order to oust unlawfully present
residents.
A.

Unintended Consequences of H.B. 56

1. Social Impact. The impact of H.B. 56 was felt swiftly in
predictable and unexpected ways, not only for illegal immigrants, but
legal residents as well. Immediately after the law's enactment the
Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama (H.I.C.A.) established a hotline
for anyone living in Alabama to call and report infringements on civil
rights resulting from the law.99 The National Immigration Law Center,
a member of H.I.C.A., published its findings based on over 6,000 calls to
the hotline 00° Based on its report, "Isicores of Latinos called to report

95. Id.

96. Id.
97.

Id. (quoting Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2510).

98.

Republican Governor Robert Bentley believes that the "essence" of the law is still

intact. Jay Reeves, Alabama Court Delivers Split Decision on Immigration Law, WASH.
TIMES, Aug. 20, 2012, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/aug/20/ala-courtdelivers-split-decision-immigration-law/.
99. HisPANIc INTEREST COALITION OF ALABAMA, http://www.hispanicinterest.org (last
visited Mar. 4, 2013).
100. NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER, RACIAL PROFILING AFTER HB 56: STORIES
FROM THE ALABAMA HOTLINE (Aug. 2012), availableat www.nilc.org/docuraent.html?id=800.
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that they suspected they had been stopped by police, after the [H.B.] 56
provisions became enforceable,'mainly because they look Latino-so that
officers could question them about their immigration status." 1 1 The
law even led to the arrest of a Mercedes-Benz executive, who could only
produce his 10 German
identification card and not his passport during a
2
traffic stop.

However, the law's effects Were not limited to interactions with
government officials. Both illegal and legal Latino residents faced
increased hostility from the general public, resulting in taunts, insults,
and the inevitable question of the individual's legality within the
country. The individual accounts included: harassment in Wal-Mart,
withheld work payment, demands by cashiers at gas stations and movie
theaters for proof of immigration status, and even denials of medical
services that were rendered prior to the enactment of H.B. 56.03
Thus, H.B. 56 emboldened citizens of Alabama "enough to deputize
themselves to enforce [H.B.] 56 and... feel free to ask or demand that
people they suspect, based usually on appearance, of being undocumented provide proof of their immigration status."10 4
2. Economic Impact. The law has also resulted in devastating hits
to several key areas of the economy, significantly contributing to
Alabama becomming "the worst economy in the Southeast," and the
fourth worst in the country.'0 5 While one of the goals behind H.B. 56
was to force unlawfully present immigrants out of Alabama in order to
open jobs for Alabama residents, such has not been the result in
practice. State Senator Scott Beason praised H.B. 56 for the recent drop
06
in the unemployment rate, going from 8.8 percent to 8.5 percent.
However, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics this drop
occurred due to an overall shrink in the labor force,' °" likely caused by
the mass exodus of Hispanics fleeing the state.

101. Id. at 2.
102. Amanda Beadle, German Mercedez-Benz Executive Arrested Under Alabama's
Immigration Law, THINK PRoGRESS (Nov. 21, 2011), httpJ/thinkprogress.orgjustice/2011
/1112 11373334/german-mercedes-benz-executive-arrested-under-alabamas-immigrationlaw/?mobile=nc.
103. NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER, supra note 100, at 5-8.
104. Id. at 8.
105. Joey Kennedy, Alabama Has the Worst Economy in the Southeast. Wonder Why?,
AL.coM (Oct. 25, 2012, 11:30 AM), http://blog.al.com/jkennedy/2012/10/alabama-has-theworsteconomy.html.
106. Margaret Newkirk, Africans Relocate to Alabama to Fill Jobs After Immigration
Law, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 11, 2012, http:'/www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-24/africansrelocate-to-alabama-to-fill-jobs-after-immigration-law.html.
107. Id.
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Indeed, an Alabama poultry company spent five million dollars
replacing and training new employees after losing many of their
Hispanic workers.'
And while the company would gladly fill any
empty jobs with residents of Alabama, oftentimes it must turn elsewhere
to find people willing to work. Accordingly, in the weeks following the
passing of the law, there has been an influx of African and Haitian
refugees and Puerto Ricans to fill those jobs left empty by those who
have fled the state. 109
The agricultural industry was hit equally as hard. Farmers who rely
on seasonal labor watched crops go unpicked as Latinos fled."0 One
tomato farmer estimated his losses from rotten produce to be as much
as $300,000 due to a lack of labor."' While programs were initiated
in some cities such as in Birmingham to attempt to recruit unemployed
citizens to replace those who left, they "did almost nothing to curb the
losses felt by farmers, who watched much of their fall harvest spoil in
the fields."" 2
The law is also impacting foreign trade, as illustrated by the
embarrassing incident with the Mercedes-Benz executive."'
Other
states will certainly seize the opportunity if Alabama is willing to give
future foreign investors hesitation when considering where to expand
their operations. Following the executive's arrest, the St. Louis PostDispatch sent a later-published letter to Mercedes-Benz proclaiming,
"You should move your SUV plant to Missouri where we are the ShowMe State, not the 'Show me your papers State."" 4 All of this resulted
from the desire to force out a population of undocumented immigrations

108.

Id.

109. Id.
110. TOM BAXTER, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS,Alabama'sImmigrationDisaster:
The Harshest Law in the Land Harms the State's Economy and Society, 7 (Feb. 2012),

available at

httpJ/www.americanprogress.orgwp-content/uploads/issues/2012/02/pdf/

alabamaimmigration-disaster.pdf.

111. Id. at 8
112. Id. at 10.
113. Id. at 13. Mercedes-Benz was the flagship of Alabama's automotive industry,
being the first to build an assembly plant in the state in 1993. Id. Honda, Hyundai, and
Toyota followed. Id.
114. Id. at 14; see also Editorial, Hey Mercedes, Time to Move to a More Welcoming
State, ST. LoUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 22, 2011, http'/www.stltoday.connews/opinion/
columns/the-platformleditorial-hey-mercedes-time-to-move-to-a-more-welcoming
/articleb5cc5237-d199-570c-8735-caa81e247249.html#ixzzlejBQ4GD8. There is speculation
regarding the loss of other foreign business as a result of H.B. 56 as well. BBVA Compass,
who owns the Spanish bank BBVA Group, backed out of plans to build an $80 million
tower in Birmingham, Alabama. BAXTER, supra note 110, at 15.
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that amounted to only 2.5 percent of the state-a group that also paid
$130 million to the state in taxes in 2010.115
Experts such as Sam Addy, an economist and Director of the Center
for Business and Economic Research at the University of Alabama,
predict dire consequences if Alabama does not put an end to the exodus
of Latinos fleeing from the state-ultimately facing the "loss of up to
about 140,000 direct and indirect jobs and $5.8 billion in earnings, $10.8
billion in Alabama's gross domestic product, and more than $300 million
in income and sales tax revenue." 6 Money speaks volumes in every
language, and it does not take a translator to understand that H.B. 56
has already proven to be bad business for the State of Alabama.
B.

Impending Challenge to Section 12

While the Eleventh Circuit allowed section 12(a)-the show-me-yourpapers-provision-to go into effect, it expressly left open the possibility
of future challenges based on the law's application." 7 With events
such as those previously mentioned occurring more frequently, a
challenge to section 12(a) seems imminent."' On top of the effects
already discussed, section 12(a) is failing to be applied uniformly across
the state. In Huntsville the police chief has refused to enforce the law
immediately, stating he will wait until the courts and lawyers sort it
out." 9 Additionally, the police chief of Clanton also believes the law
cannot be enforced in part "because state lawmakers this year repealed
a provision authorizing police to arrest motorists for driving without a
license." 2 ° In contrast, the law is being enforced by police in Mont121
gomery and Tuscaloosa.
With dissent in the ranks of their law enforcement, how can citizens
of Alabama expect the law to be applied uniformly across the state?
There is too much discretion granted to individual officers who have
received no training and, at most, minimal guidance regarding a law
they do not fully understand, which in turn creates too great an avenue
for discrimination to occur. As critics have noticed, the uneven

115.

BAXTER, supra note 110, at 1.

116. Jeremy Redmon, Alabama's Show-me-your-papers Law: A Cautionary Tale for
Georgia,ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 16,2012, http://www.ajc.com/news/news/alabamas-showme-your-papers-law-a-cautionary-tale/nSCXw/.

117. Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1285.
118. See supra notes 101-104.
119. Lee Roop, Huntsville Police Chief"Immigration Ruling Unclear, Law Won't be
Enforced Yet, AL.COM (Oct. 11, 2012, 11:18 PM), http//blog.al.com/breaking/2011/09/hunts
ville-policechief_immigr.html.

120. Redmon, supra note 116.
121. Id.
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application of the law only furthers the opportunity for racial profiling,
all on top of the aforementioned impact to the state's economy. 2 As
such, it seems only a matter of time before the misapplication of the law
results in another challenge to its validity.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In United States v. Alabama,'2 ' the Eleventh Circuit held that
several sections of Alabama's H.B. 56 were preempted by federal
law. 1"4 As a result of this decision, the scope of state authority to
regulate immigration within their borders is narrowing. While the
decision is certainly a victory for proponents of those unlawfully present
within Alabama, states will undoubtedly continue to test the boundaries
of immigration policy within their own sovereign territory.
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